came to the throne in 1760 vowing to rule as a "patriot king."
1 Instead, Pincus emphasizes the Patriots' consumer-centered political economy, their support for government-subsidized projects of various sorts, their developmental vision of Britain's overseas empire, their immigration-friendly policies, and their precocious opposition to slavery, all of which he attributes to the party's Whig roots. In each of these areas, he writes, Patriots embraced "principles that would resonate deeply in America's Declaration of Independence three and a half decades later" (p. 40).
If Patriots were proto-Keynesian liberals, the British ministers who held office under George III get to play their fiscally conservative opposites. Heading up the cast of ministerial Scrooges is George Grenville. During Grenville's two-year premiership, which lasted from 1763 to 1765, Parliament enacted the Sugar Act (1764) and the American Stamp Act (1765), along with a host of other colonial reforms. All were deeply unpopular in America. The Stamp Act, in particular, launched the colonial resistance movement that led just over a decade later to the Declaration of Independence. In explaining the origins of Grenville's reforms, Pincus describes the prime minister and his supporters as Francophiles who wanted to apply French political economy and administrative methods to America. Terrified by the ballooning debt from Britain's victories in the Seven Years' War, they attempted to balance the Treasury's books with a policy of fiscal "austerity and colonial extraction" (p. 54). Given the frequency with which he uses the term-variations of extraction recur by my count thirty-one times in the text, or roughly once every five pages-Pincus is surprisingly vague about what extractive taxation means. The phrase may refer to the way the Sugar and Stamp Acts taxed an array of consumer goods, inhibiting, rather than encouraging, consumption (p. 100). Echoing a charge repeatedly made by Grenville's critics, Pincus also claims that the main purpose of both taxes was to pay down Britain's "enormous national debt" (p. 59). Here, extractive presumably means extracting funds from America to be sent to Britain.
In the book's final section, Pincus takes up the Patriot response to Grenville's policies. He examines that response both in Britain, where an array of Patriots-Wilkes, Pitt, Richard Price, John Cartwright, and many, many others-challenged the wisdom of Grenville's fiscal reforms, and in America, where the new measures set the colonies on the road to revolution. In one of his more contentious claims, Pincus says that Patriots everywhere, including the American Founders, were far more concerned about preserving the benefits of "energetic government" than they were with "the location of sovereignty" (p. 141). Big government, apparently, was not one of the Founders' big concerns. To prove the point, he invokes the Articles of Confederation, which served as the union's federal charter from 1777 until the Congressional election of 1789 and Washington's inauguration as President. Although the Articles envisioned a much weaker central government than the Constitution that replaced it, Pincus maintains that the Founders intended the Confederation to be "stronger than any [confederation] the world had ever seen" (pp. 140-141). When the shortcomings of the first attempt at a "strong" government became clear, delegates to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 went back to the drawing board and replaced it with a new, improved version. They did so because they shared the same Patriot commitment to "energetic imperial government" that had animated the signers of the Declaration of Independence in 1776, and that Patriots in Britain had espoused since the age of Walpole (p. 149).
The result is a pointed, at times combative polemic; one that often reads like a knuckle-rapping response to the Tea Party wing of the Republican Party. Even Washington, it seems, was in favor of massive infrastructure spending. In this eagerness to score political points, the book occasionally overreaches. The tendency is noticeable, for example, in Pincus's failure to acknowledge the Patriot claims advanced by both George III and his early ministers, including Grenville. Although he was despised by English Patriots like Wilkes, Grenville entered Parliament in 1741 as a member of the so-called Boy Patriots. He was a political ally of William Pitt, who married his sister Hester Grenville in 1754, and he served in Pitt's Patriot ministry during the Seven Years' War. In 1761, the two brothers-in-law had a public falling out when Grenville remained in office after Pitt's resignation, yet Grenville and his supporters presented his American reforms as a continuation of Pitt's Patriot program, not a repudiation. In his influential 1765 defense of the new measures, Grenville's Treasury Secretary Thomas Whately cited the Stamp and Sugar Acts as proof that Britain was making the colonies' security and welfare its chief concern.
2 This was what Patriots had urged for decades. Wilkes and Adams, it turns out, were not the empire's only Patriots. So too, in their own way, were George III and his ministers.
Describing the fiscal and economic consequences of Grenville's reforms as extractive also misses the mark. Although Pincus claims that Grenville pushed the Sugar and Stamp Acts to service Britain's national debt, the actual purpose of both measures was to help cover the cost of the 10,000 British regulars left to defend Britain's new possessions at the end of the Seven Years' War in Florida, Canada, and the Indian territory of the trans-Appalachian West. Neither tax was extractive in the sense of transferring funds from the colonies to Britain. Instead, the revenue was to be spent on soldiers in America. No less an authority than John Dickinson, author of Letters from a Pennsylvania Farmer (1768), saw "something gentle and kind" in Grenville's ill-judged reforms and thought they "aimed only at our welfare." 3 Equally important, with a total estimated annual yield of 170 to 180 thousand pounds (which turned out to be wildly optimistic), the two revenue measures were unlikely, at least in the near term, to raise the £225,000 that Grenville calculated as the North American garrison's yearly cost. 4 When the ledgers were balanced, Britain appeared to be subsidizing America, not the other way around. If anyone was being subjected to extractive taxation, it was the British.
By opting for a polemical view of the British origins of the American Revolution, Pincus sets himself up to miss the greatest irony of all: the republican empire that Americans created depended on a political economy that looked a lot like the political economy that Grenville envisioned for British America in 1764 and 1765. From a constitutional standpoint, of course, the American republic, with its loose-knit, citizen-based union of states, was a fundamentally different entity from the British Empire. As a military-fiscal power, however, the post-1789 Federal Government followed the same general strategy as the British government had before 1776. To fund the ordinary costs of government, including a (small) standing army to keep the peace in Indian Country, Congress taxed foreign imports, most of which were consumer goods, and domestic distilled spirits. In other words, the Founders elected to fund their new government by taxing consumption, which of course was what Parliament had tried to do in the Sugar and Stamp Acts. If Pincus is aware of the irony, he makes no mention of it. Unlike Grenville's "extractive" taxes on consumption, he writes, the Founders' taxes on consumption showed their commitment to "taxation for the common good" (p. 147). Americans at the time were less sure. During the so-called Whiskey Rebellion of 1794, farmers in western Pennsylvania, many of whom owed their livelihoods to distilling grain and shipping it to market as whiskey, responded to the tax on spirits with the most serious insurrection against Federal authority before the Civil War. Meet the new boss, same as the old boss.
Pincus is not the first historian to find modern parables in the American Revolution. During the Vietnam War, in what remains the single best essay ever written on the military history of the Revolutionary War, John Shy used America's failure to win "hearts and minds" in Southeast Asia as a way to understand the enormous obstacles that the British army faced in the struggle for the allegiance of ordinary civilians between 1775 and 1783. 5 The corollary was that if Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon had been better students of the nation's early history, they might not have been so eager to embrace their own unwinnable conflict. More recently, the "decent respect to the opinions of mankind" with which Thomas Jefferson opened the Declaration of Independence has provided a subtle, but clear, counterpoint to unilateralist tendencies in U.S. foreign policy since September 11, 2001. When making comparisons between then and now, however, historians tend to be careful not to lean too heavily on the parallels. The contrast usually appears most explicitly in accompanying commentaries and reviews, not the original work. The reason for this hesitation is not hard to find. Politically satisfying though polemical histories may be, they are almost always partial histories, and they tend to have a brief shelf life.
Despite the polemical character of his book, Steve Pincus is not wrong to place questions of political economy at the center of the American Revolution. It was not the only issue that mattered to the Founding Generation, nor was it always the most important, but it clearly was important. In recent years, the economy has steadily grown in importance as a topic in modern American politics. There can be no doubt that in histories of the American Revolution that are yet to be written, the economy is likely to be one of the key questions that historians have to address. Although the message could have been delivered with greater balance and fuller discussion of the facts, Pincus is right to remind everyone of that important point.
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